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Queller’s ‘Separation Condition’ Explained and Defended∗
Jonathan Birch† and James A. R. Marshall‡
June 4, 2014
Abstract : The theories of inclusive fitness and multi-level selection provide alternative
perspectives on social evolution. The question of whether these perspectives are of equal
generality remains a divisive issue. In a 1992 analysis based on the Price equation,
Queller argued (by means of a principle he called the ‘separation condition’) that the
two approaches are subject to the same limitations, arising from their fundamentally
quantitative-genetical character. Recently, van Veelen et al. have challenged Queller’s
results, using this as the basis for a broader critique of the Price equation, the ‘separation
condition’ and the very notion of inclusive fitness. Here we show that the van Veelen
et al. model, when analysed in the way Queller intended, confirms rather than refutes
his original conclusions. We thereby confirm (i) that Queller’s ‘separation condition’
remains a legitimate theoretical principle, and (ii) that the standard inclusive fitness
and multi-level approaches are indeed subject to the same limitations.
1 Introduction
The theories of inclusive fitness and multi-level selection provide alternative perspectives
on social evolution. From an inclusive fitness perspective, the genes for a social behaviour
spread because they contribute to the inclusive fitness of their bearers: that is, they
make a positive contribution to the actor’s genetic representation in future generations
(Hamilton 1964, 1970; Gardner et al. 2011). From a multi-level selection (or group
selection) perspective, the evolution of social behaviour results from the interplay of
selection within groups and selection between groups (Price 1972; Wilson 1975; Okasha
2006).
The formal parallels between the two theories are striking. Both approaches typi-
cally begin with a partition of the Price equation (Price 1970, 1972). In the inclusive
fitness partition, we split the change attributable to selection into components separately
attributable to the direct and indirect fitness eﬀects of the social behaviour under con-
sideration (Queller 1992a; Gardner et al. 2011). In the multi-level partition, we split the
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change into components separately attributable to selection within groups and selection
between groups (Price 1972; Wade 1985; Okasha 2006). It is straightforward to show
that, when formulated in purely genetic terms, these alternative partitions of the Price
equation are formally equivalent, in the sense that they can never disagree regarding the
direction of the response to selection (Hamilton 1975; Wenseleers et al. 2010; Marshall
2011).
Although one might have expected these equivalence results to put to rest any debate
about the relative accuracy or generality of the two approaches, recent years have seen
numerous arguments to the eﬀect that one approach (usually the multi-level approach)
is more accurate and/or applicable to a wider range of cases than the other (Wilson
and Ho¨lldobler 2005; van Veelen 2009; Traulsen 2010; Nowak et al. 2010; van Veelen
et al. 2010, 2012). We suspect that one important reason for this continuing disagree-
ment is that results establishing the equivalence of the inclusive fitness and multi-level
perspectives tend to rely on purely genetic formulations of the two theories. Yet when
we apply the theories to particular ecological scenarios, we usually want to ‘play the
phenotypic gambit’ (Grafen 1984; Queller 2011): that is, we want to work with partly
phenotypic formulations of the theories that focus on the fitness eﬀects and heritabilities
of behavioural phenotypes. The problem is that demonstrating the equivalence of the
two frameworks when both are formulated genetically does not settle the question of
whether they constitute equally valid ways to play the phenotypic gambit.
In an analysis based on the Price equation, D. C. Queller (1992b) directly addressed
this question. He argued that both the inclusive fitness and multi-level approaches (as
applied to behavioural phenotypes) are, at heart, quantitative-genetical approaches that
seek to separate selection gradients (which relate behavioural phenotypes to fitness) from
heritabilities (which relate behavioural phenotypes to underlying genotypes)—and that
both approaches succeed or fail to achieve this separation under the same conditions and
for the same reasons. More specifically, he identified a formal ‘separation condition’ and
showed that, for both the standard inclusive fitness and multi-level approaches (both of
which traditionally rely on two phenotypic predictors of fitness), a quantitative-genetic
separation of selection gradients from heritabilities is unattainable when genetic relatives
interact in ways that yield non-additive payoﬀs. The upshot is that both approaches
require additional predictors in order to accommodate such deviations from additivity.
This result has led to the development of extended formulations of inclusive fitness theory
in which deviations from additivity are explicitly represented and analysed (Smith et
al. 2010; Queller 2011; Cornforth et al. 2012). These extended formulations have already
proved invaluable in lab studies of microbial cooperation, a context in which accounting
for deviations from additivity turns out to be particularly important (Smith et al. 2010;
Cornforth et al. 2012).
We see Queller’s ‘separation condition’, and his conclusions concerning when it is
satisfied, as results of wide and profound significance for both behavioural ecologists and
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quantitative geneticists. Moreover, we want to emphasize that these results are valuable
not only for theorists, but also for biologists studying social behaviour in the field and
in the lab. In brief, this is because many empirical, quantitative-genetic studies of social
evolution employ roughly the following methodology: first, use regression analysis to
estimate the fitness eﬀects and heritabilities of behavioural phenotypes; second, use
the breeder’s equation, or some suitably extended version of the breeder’s equation, to
predict the response to selection from these fitness eﬀects and heritabilities (Falconer and
Mackay 1996; McGlothlin et al. 2010, 2014). Empirical studies which use an inclusive
fitness approach (e.g. Pfennig et al. 1999; Krakauer 2005; Chuang et al. 2010; Hatchwell
et al. 2014) and those which use a multi-level selection approach (e.g. Tsuji 1995; Eldakar
et al. 2010; Formica et al. 2010) all fall under this broad description, although (as we
show below) the two approaches represent two diﬀerent ways of extending the traditional
breeder’s equation. Queller’s ‘separation condition’ has direct import for such studies,
because it provides a general statement of the conditions under which the breeder’s
equation-based methodology they employ will work. If our regression model satisfies
the separation condition, then the predictions delivered by this method will be accurate.
If it does not, then the predictions are likely to mislead, since there will be a residual
‘unseparated’ component of the response to selection that our regression model fails
to account for. Finding regression models that satisfy the separation condition when
simple models violate it is thus a central challenge for empirical studies in behavioural
ecology.
Unfortunately, because Queller framed his (1992b) argument in a relatively informal
way, he left room for doubt about the meaning of his crucial ‘separation condition’ and
the validity of the results he derived from it. In a recent critique, M. van Veelen et
al. (2012) argue (by means of a simple game-theoretic model) that the separation con-
dition is irrelevant to the question of the comparative generality of inclusive fitness and
multi-level selection, and that, moreover, the two approaches are not equally general
after all. If these new results were valid, they would have far reaching implications for
social evolution theory; for in addition to challenging conventional wisdom about the
relationship between inclusive fitness and multi-level selection, they would also vitiate
the program (pursued by Smith et al. 2010 and Queller 2011) of using the separation
condition to develop extended, more general formulations of Hamilton’s rule. In this
note, however, we come to Queller’s defence. We show that, if one interprets the ‘sep-
aration condition’ in the way that Queller intended it to be understood, the formal
model advanced by van Veelen et al. supports rather than refutes his conclusions re-
garding the circumstances under which the condition is satisfied. It therefore supports
Queller’s broader thesis that there is an important sense in which the inclusive fitness
and multi-level approaches are subject to the same limitations.
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2 What is the ‘separation condition’?
Queller’s immediate aim in formulating the ‘separation condition’ was to elucidate the
conditions under which a specified regression model of fitness, when used to analyse
the evolutionary change in some character, can successfully separate quantities that re-
late genotype to phenotype from quantities that relate phenotype to fitness. In other
words, Queller’s ‘separations’ are quantitative-genetic separations of quantities that mea-
sure a trait’s heritability from quantities that measure the strength of selection on that
trait. The simplest example of such a separation is the breeder’s equation (Falconer
and Mackay 1996), which expresses the response to selection (R) on some character as
the product of a selection diﬀerential (S) and the narrow-sense heritability (h2) of the
character:
R = Sh2 (1)
Queller’s ‘separation condition’ is intended to capture the conditions under which a
given regression model of fitness can achieve a quantitative-genetic separation of this
sort.
The reasoning that leads to the ‘separation condition’ is easiest to see in the simplest
case of a one-predictor regression model of fitness. We start with the simple Price
equation (Price 1970; Queller 1992b), which identifies the evolutionary change in the
breeding value (G) for some character between parental and oﬀspring populations with
the covariance between breeding value and fitness (W ) in the parental population (we
explain the notion of a breeding value below; for now, note simply that it is a quantitative
measure of one’s genotype):
W∆G = Cov(W,G) (2)
The covariance between W and G is aﬀected by both the heritability of the character
and the strength of selection on it. Suppose that we hope to separate these eﬀects by
means of the following one-predictor regression model:
W = α+ βWPP + ϵW (3)
in which α is the intercept of the regression line, P is the phenotypic value of the focal
individual with respect to the character of interest, βWP is the slope of fitness on pheno-
typic value, and ϵW is the residual (i.e. the extent to which the focal individual’s fitness
departs from the regression prediction). By substituting (3) into (2) and making the
assumption that Cov(G, ϵW ) = 0, we can derive the following partition of evolutionary
change (Queller 1992b):
W∆G = βWPCov(G,P ) (4)
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We have now expressed the overall W -G covariance as a product of two quantities: one
relating fitness to phenotype, and the other relating genotype to phenotype. In fact,
we have arrived at a result that is formally equivalent to the breeder’s equation. To see
this, note that βWPCov(G,P ) = βGPCov(W,P ), and note that the regression coeﬃcient
βGP is a measure of narrow-sense heritability h2, while Cov(W,P ) is a measure of the
selection diﬀerential S (Queller 1992b; Falconer and Mackay 1996).
Crucially, our assumption that Cov(G, ϵW ) = 0 is what makes this separation pos-
sible. If Cov(G, ϵW ) = 0, then our regression model has fully accounted for the W -G
covariance. By contrast, if the residuals in the regression model co-vary with G, then
there is a residual component of the W -G covariance that our one-predictor regression
model has failed to account for. This residual covariance will remain ‘unseparated’
(i.e. we will not be able to rewrite it as a product of a quantity relating P to W and
a quantity relating G to P ) unless we add more predictors to our regression model to
account for it. For this reason, Queller refers to Cov(G, ϵW ) = 0 as the ‘separation
condition’:
Separation condition: Cov(G, ϵW ) = 0 (5)
We should note from the outset that the mathematics of regression provide no guarantee
that the separation condition will be satisfied by any phenotypic regression model. It
is guaranteed that the residuals in a regression model do not co-vary with any of the
predictors, but when we ‘play the phenotypic gambit’ our predictors are phenotypic, not
genetic, and G is not among them (cf. Queller 1992a, b, 2011).
Equation (5) provides an adequate general statement of the separation condition. It
is vital, however, to note that the precise meaning of ϵW (and hence the precise meaning
of the separation condition) is not absolute, but rather depends on the regression model
of fitness we are working with. It always denotes the portion of the fitness of the focal
individual that our regression model fails to account for, but altering the predictor
set will typically change the residuals, and may accordingly aﬀect whether or not the
separation condition is satisfied. We cannot overemphasize this point: the separation
condition must always be defined relative to a specified regression model, and the ϵW
variable always refers to the residuals in that model.
For example, inclusive fitness analyses of social evolution often make use of the
following two-predictor regression model (Queller 1992a, b, 2011; Frank 1998, 2013;
McGlothlin et al. 2014):
W = α+ βWP.P ′P + βWP ′.PP
′ + ϵW (6)
in which βWP.P ′ is the partial regression of one’s fitness on one’s own phenotype, control-
ling for the eﬀect of one’s social partner’s phenotype; βWP ′.P is the partial regression
of one’s fitness on one’s social partner’s phenotype, controlling for the eﬀect of one’s
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own; α is again the intercept of the regression line; and ϵW is again the residual, i.e. the
extent to which the focal individual’s fitness departs from the value predicted by the
regression model. On the assumption that Cov(G, ϵW ) = 0 (i.e. that the separation
condition is satisfied), we can use this two-predictor regression to derive the following
decomposition of evolutionary change:
W∆G = βWP.P ′Cov(G,P ) + βWP ′.PCov(G,P
′) (7)
from which it is straightforward to derive versions of Hamilton’s rule (Queller 1992b;
Frank 1998, 2013; McGlothlin et al. 2014). As Queller points out, equation (7) may
be conceptualized as a natural extension of the breeder’s equation to accommodate
(additive) social interaction, since the fitness eﬀects of a social trait on oneself and on
one’s social partners are weighted (respectively) by a measure of the trait’s heritability
via each pathway. The separation condition (5) again captures what is needed for our
regression model to fully separate selection gradients from heritabilities. But note that
its precise meaning is diﬀerent in this case. For in this case, it amounts to the condition
that the residuals in our two-predictor regression model (6) do not co-vary with breeding
value.
For a second example, consider the regression models we need in order to ‘play the
phenotypic gambit’ within the framework provided by G. R. Price’s (1972) formulation
of multi-level selection theory. A multi-level analysis first splits the overall evolutionary
change into a between-group component and a within-group component, and then seeks
to separate the eﬀects of selection and heritability on each component. One way to
achieve this separation is to start with Price’s multi-level version of the Price equation,
in which the covariance term of the simple equation is partitioned into between-group
and within-group components (Price 1972; see Appendix for details). We can then
introduce two simple regression models, one expressing a group’s fitness as a function of
its average phenotypic value, and the other expressing an individual’s diﬀerential fitness
relative to its local group mean as a function of its own phenotypic value. As we show in
the Appendix, we can use these two simple regressions to achieve a clean separation of
selection gradients and heritabilities at each level, but only if we assume both that the
residuals in the group-level regression are independent of group breeding value and that
the residuals in the individual-level regression are independent of individual breeding
value. Hence, once again, a version of Queller’s separation condition captures what
is needed for our regression model to achieve a clean separation of selection gradients
and heritabilities; but once again, its meaning is subtly diﬀerent in this case. For in
this case, it amounts to the condition that (i) the residuals in our regression model
of group fitness do not co-vary with group breeding value, and that (ii) the residuals
in our regression model of individual fitness (relative to the local group mean) do not
co-vary with individual breeding value. A multi-level quantitative-genetic separation is
attainable only if both conditions (i.e. one for each level) are satisfied.
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3 The van Veelen et al. synergy game
We now introduce the probabilistic synergy game presented by van Veelen et al. (2012).
In the following we have altered the notation slightly from the original, in order to
disambiguate allelic values from breeding values. Individuals interact in pairs drawn
from an infinite population. Every individual has an allelic value X, such that X = 1 if
the individual possesses the social allele of interest andX = 0 otherwise. Similarly, every
individual has a phenotypic value P , such that P = 1 if the individual expresses the
social phenotype of interest and P = 0 otherwise. A fraction r of individuals are assigned
a social partner with an allelic value guaranteed to be identical to their own (and thus
r can be equated with genetic relatedness; Grafen 1985). A fraction (1 − r) have their
social partner drawn uniformly at random from the population. Of individuals with the
allele (X = 1), a fraction P express the cooperative phenotype (P = 1). Individuals who
do not possess the allele (X = 0) never express the cooperative phenotype (P = 0). The
payoﬀ matrix for interactions is given in Table 1 (where P ′ denotes the phenotype of the
focal individual’s social partner), and the frequencies of the various possible character
combinations are given in the Appendix (Table A2).
At this juncture, we also need to introduce breeding values. We note in passing that
van Veelen et al. do not do this; but it is necessary to do so, because the separation
condition is defined in terms of breeding values rather than allelic values. Roughly
speaking, an individual’s breeding value with respect to a character P is a measure of
its genetic predisposition to express P . More precisely, it is its value for that character
as predicted by a linear combination of its allelic values, weighted by their average
eﬀects on the character (Falconer and Mackay 1996; Frank 1998; Gardner et al. 2011).
If βPX = 1, we could simply identify breeding values with allelic values, but in this game
βPX = P. Accordingly, individuals with the allele have a breeding value for P equal to
P (X = 1 ⇒ G = P), while individuals without the allele have a breeding value for P
equal to 0 (X = 0⇒ G = 0).
P ′ = 1 P ′ = 0
P = 1 b− c+ d −c
P = 0 b 0
Table 1: Non-additive payoﬀ matrix as used in the probabilistic synergy game analysed
by van Veelen et al.. The game is symmetric; payoﬀs to the focal (row) individual are
shown in the table. As the table indicates, c denotes a payoﬀ incurred by an agent if
and only if it cooperates; b denotes a payoﬀ received by an agent if and only if its social
partner cooperates; and d denotes a ‘synergistic’ payoﬀ that both players obtain if and
only if they both cooperate.
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4 Does the van Veelen et al. model support or refute
Queller’s argument?
The key claims of Queller’s (1992b) analysis are (a) that the two-predictor regression
model of fitness that underlies the standard inclusive fitness approach (i.e. our equation
(6)) satisfies the separation condition when the payoﬀs of social interactions between
relatives are wholly additive, but violates it when these payoﬀs deviate from additivity
(Queller 1992b, p. 551), and (b) that the two-predictor regression model of fitness that
underlies the standard multi-level selection approach also fails the separation condition
under the same circumstances (Queller 1992b, p. 553). From these results, Queller in-
ferred that the standard inclusive fitness and multi-level selection approaches are subject
to the same limitations, and that neither is more general than the other.
van Veelen et al. argue that the simple synergy game presented above, in which a
prosocial behaviour is expressed probabilistically, yields a counterexample to both of
these key claims. This is because they take their model to show that the additivity of
the payoﬀ matrix is irrelevant to whether or not the separation condition is satisfied.
More precisely, van Veelen et al. (2012, p. 71) assert that:
The separation condition is satisfied ⇐⇒ b = 0 or r = 0 or P = 1 or P = 0 (8)
in which b represents the additive component of the benefit conferred by the behaviour,
r represents the coeﬃcient of genetic relatedness, and P represents the probability that a
gene encoding the prosocial phenotype is expressed. Crucially, and contrary to Queller’s
(1992b) results, the deviation from additivity (d) is absent from the right-hand side of
the biconditional.
This alleged refutation of Queller rests on a misunderstanding of the separation
condition. The root of the misunderstanding is the point we emphasized in Section 2:
because the ϵW variable represents the residuals in a specified regression model, the
separation condition only has meaning relative to a specified regression model. When
Queller asserts that deviations from additivity lead to violations of the separation condi-
tion, we take him to be referring specifically to the separation condition as defined with
respect to a two-predictor regression model, whether of the inclusive fitness or multi-level
selection variety. Regardless of Queller’s original meaning, it is plain that only the sepa-
ration condition as defined with respect to a two-predictor regression model will help us
to identify the circumstances under which the standard inclusive fitness and multi-level
approaches cleanly separate the eﬀects of selection and heritability.
In contrast to Queller, van Veelen et al. consider only whether or not the separation
condition is satisfied with respect to a one-predictor regression model. They argue
(correctly) that this has nothing to do with whether or not payoﬀs are additive, but
rather depends only on whether or not social partners are genetically related. This
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point, although correct, was already noted by Queller (1992b, p. 545), and so it does
not constitute a refutation of his argument. Moreover, it implies nothing at all about the
conditions under which the separation condition is satisfied by a two-predictor regression
model, and so does not bear either way on the claim that a two-predictor regression
model fails the separation condition if and only if relatives interact non-additively.
Drawing attention to van Veelen and colleagues’ misconstrual of the separation con-
dition is enough to show that their alleged refutation of Queller does not succeed. How-
ever, it does not settle the question of whether or not Queller was actually correct
about the parallel limitations of inclusive fitness and multi-level selection, which is the
broader question at stake. To address this question, we here re-analyse van Veelen and
colleagues’ synergy game, this time evaluating the separation condition as defined with
respect to the two-predictor regression models that characterize the standard inclusive
fitness and multi-level selection approaches.
To say that the separation condition (SC) is satisfied by the standard inclusive
fitness approach in the context of the van Veelen et al. synergy game is to say that the
residuals in the two-predictor regression (6) do not co-vary with breeding value in this
game, and consequently that the quantitative-genetic separation envisioned in equation
(7) is indeed a correct statement about the evolutionary change in this game. Hence:
The SC is satisfied by the IF regression model ⇐⇒
Cov(W,G) = βWP.P ′Cov(P,G) + βWP ′.PCov(P
′, G) (9)
The simplest way to evaluate whether the inclusive fitness approach does indeed satisfy
the separation condition in this game is to express Cov(W,G) and βWP.P ′Cov(P,G) +
βWP ′.PCov(P ′, G) as functions of the parameters of the game, and use these expressions
to work out the parameter values for which these quantities are equal. The payoﬀ
matrix (table A1) and the frequencies of the various possible interactions (given in the
Appendix) give us all the information we need to do this. We will not elaborate on
the steps in the computation here (see the Appendix for details). The bottom line is
that the separation condition is satisfied by the IF regression model only for parameter
values that satisfy the following equality:
P(r + (1− r)p)d = P
(
1 + r
1 + βP ′P
)
(r + (1− r)p)d (10)
When genetic relatives interact non-additively (so that d ̸= 0) and genotype does not
determine phenotype (implying that βP ′P ̸= r), this equality is not satisfied, and accord-
ingly the separation condition is not satisfied by the inclusive fitness regression model.
The equality is satisfied if payoﬀs are perfectly additive (such that d = 0), or if social
partners are genetically unrelated (such that r = 0), or if genotype unconditionally
determines phenotype (such that P = 1 or P = 0), but not otherwise. In short:
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The SC is satisfied by the IF regression model ⇐⇒
d = 0 or r = 0 or P = 1 or P = 0 (11)
In the Online Appendix, we further show that a two-predictor multi-level regression
model also satisfies the separation condition only if d = 0 or r = 0 or P = 1 or P = 0;
hence it too will violate the separation condition when genetic relatives interact non-
additively and genotype does not determine phenotype. We therefore verify both of
Queller’s key claims.
5 Conclusion
In sum, our re-analysis of the van Veelen et al. synergy game reveals that the game sup-
ports Queller’s central claim that the standard inclusive fitness and multi-level selection
approaches (conceptualized in terms of the two-predictor phenotypic regression models
they traditionally employ) both fail to separate the eﬀects of selection and heritability
on behavioural evolution when relatives interact in ways that yield non-additive pay-
oﬀs. Our analysis thus supports Queller’s broader thesis that the two approaches are
subject to the same limitations, arising from their fundamentally quantitative-genetical
character. Since deviations from payoﬀ additivity are surely common in nature (Strass-
mann and Queller 2007), this underlines the value of developing extended formulations
of both approaches in which deviations from additivity are explicitly represented (Smith
et al. 2010; Queller 2011; Cornforth et al. 2012).
We should note that we do not take our results to imply that simple, two-predictor
phenotypic regression models of fitness should be completely discarded in social evolu-
tion theory. This is because there are conditions under which an additive model provides
a reasonable approximation of a more complex fitness structure. For example, it may
provide a reasonable approximation if selection is weak, depending on how the ‘weak se-
lection’ assumption is formulated (Uyenoyama and Feldman 1982; Michod 1982; Grafen
1985; Wild and Traulsen 2007). Nevertheless, our results do highlight the limitations of
two-predictor phenotypic regression models when payoﬀs deviate from additivity, and
they verify Queller’s claim (challenged by van Veelen et al.) that such models are subject
to the same limitations in both their inclusive fitness and multi-level selection guises.
Moreover, our analysis reinforces the value of Queller’s separation condition as a formal
tool with which to address such questions.
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Appendix: Regression Analysis of a Synergy Game with
Probabilistic Gene Expression
The basic setup for the van Veelen et al. synergy game with probabilistic gene expression
is described in the main text. For ease of reference, the payoﬀ matrix is given in Table
A1 below. The frequencies of diﬀerent possible interacting pairs in this game is given in
Table A2. Here we give technical details on the derivation of our results concerning the
parameter values for which two-predictor regression models (whether of the inclusive
fitness or multi-level variety) satisfy Queller’s separation condition.
P ′ = 1 P ′ = 0
P = 1 b− c+ d −c
P = 0 b 0
Table A1: Non-additive payoﬀmatrix as used in the probabilistic synergy game analysed
by van Veelen et al.. The game is symmetric; payoﬀs to the focal (row) individual are
shown in the table. As the table indicates, c denotes a payoﬀ incurred by an agent if
and only if it cooperates; b denotes a payoﬀ received by an agent if and only if its social
partner cooperates; and d denotes a ‘synergistic’ payoﬀ that both players obtain if and
only if they both cooperate.
A. The inclusive fitness case
We start with the two-predictor inclusive fitness (IF) regression model (equation (6) in
the main text). To say that the separation condition (SC) is satisfied by this regression
model in the context of the van Veelen et al. synergy game is to say that the residuals in
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X ′ = 0, P ′ = 0 X ′ = 1, P ′ = 0 X ′ = 1, P ′ = 1
X = 0, P = 0 (r + (1− r)(1− p))(1− p) (1−P)p(1− p)(1− r) Pp(1− p)(1− r)
X = 1, P = 0 (1−P)p(1− p)(1− r) (1−P)2(r + (1− r)p)p P(1−P)(r + (1− r)p)p
X = 1, P = 1 Pp(1− p)(1− r) P(1−P)(r + (1− r)p)p P2(r + (1− r)p)p
Table A2: Frequencies of the diﬀerent possible interactions between individuals having
diﬀerent allelic values and expressed phenotypes, where X ′ and P ′ denote (respectively)
the allelic value and phenotypic value of the focal individual’s social partner.
the regression model do not co-vary with breeding value in this game, and consequently
that the quantitative-genetic separation envisioned in equation (equation (7) in the main
text) is indeed a correct statement about the evolutionary change in this game. Hence:
The SC is satisfied by the IF regression model ⇐⇒
Cov(W,G) = βWP.P ′Cov(P,G) + βWP ′.PCov(P
′, G) (A1)
The simplest way to evaluate when the inclusive fitness regression model does indeed sat-
isfy the separation condition in this game is to express Cov(W,G) and βWP.P ′Cov(P,G)+
βWP ′.PCov(P ′, G) as functions of the parameters of the game, and use these expressions
to work out the parameter values for which these quantities are equal. The payoﬀ matrix
(Table A1) and the frequencies of the various possible interactions (Table A2) give us
all the information we need to do this. We start with the three covariances, which we
compute to be the following:
Cov(W,G) = (−c+ rb+P(r + (1− r)p)d)Pp(1− p) (A2)
Cov(P,G) = Pp(1− p) (A3)
Cov(P ′, G) = rPp(1− p) (A4)
To compute the two partial regression coeﬃcients following the standard least-squares
method outlined by Gardner et al. (2011), we first compute the following quantities:
Cov(W,P ) = [−c+ rb+P(r + (1− r)p)d]Pp(1−Pp) (A5)
Cov(W,P ′) = [b− rc+P(r + (1− r)p)d]Pp(1−Pp) (A6)
Var(P ) = Pp(1−Pp) (A7)
from which we obtain the simple regressions of fitness on phenotype:
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βWP =
Cov(W,P )
Var(P )
= −c+ rb+P(r + (1− r)p)d (A8)
βWP ′ =
Cov(W,P ′)
Var(P )
= b− rc+P(r + (1− r)p)d (A9)
We then apply the formula for the partial regression coeﬃcients in a two-predictor
regression model (Gardner et al. 2011):
βWP.P ′ =
βWP − βWP ′βP ′P
1− ρ2PP ′
(A10)
Since phenotypes can only take the values 1 or 0 in this game, the correlation coeﬃ-
cient ρPP ′ is equal to the regression coeﬃcient βP ′P . Making this simplification, and
substituting in our values for the simple regressions, we obtain:
βWP.P ′ = −c+ P1 + βP ′P (r + (1− r)p)d (A11)
βWP ′.P = b+
P
1 + βP ′P
(r + (1− r)p)d (A12)
Combining our expressions from (A3), (A4), (A11) and (A12), we obtain:
βWP.P ′Cov(P,G) + βWP ′.PCov(P
′, G) =[
−c+ rb+P
(
1 + r
1 + βP ′P
)
(r + (1− r)p)d
]
Pp(1− p) (A13)
Equations (A13) contains a placeholder for βP ′P , a measure of the statistical association
between our two phenotypic predictors. Computing βP ′P from the frequency table, we
find that:
βP ′P = P(r + (1− r)p)− Pp1−Pp [(1− p)(1− r) + (1−P)(r + (1− r)p))] (A14)
Note that βP ′P = r in the special case of P = 1, and consequently in this special case our
expressions for βWP ′.P and βWP.P ′ reduce (as they should) to those derived by Gardner
et al. (2007, 2011) for a synergy game in which genotype unconditionally determines
phenotype.
Taken together, these results vindicate Queller’s original claim about the inclusive
fitness regression model. For recall that the separation condition is satisfied by this
regression model if and only if our expression for Cov(W,G) (i.e. the right-hand side
of equation (A2)) is equal to our expression for βWP.P ′Cov(P,G) + βWP ′.PCov(P ′, G)
(i.e. the right-hand side of equation (A13)). Since the b and c terms in our two expres-
sions cancel, this boils down to the following:
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The SC is satisfied by the IF regression model ⇐⇒
P(r + (1− r)p)d = P
(
1 + r
1 + βP ′P
)
(r + (1− r)p)d (A15)
As stated in the main text, this implies that the separation condition is satisfied by
the IF regression if and only if payoﬀs are perfectly additive (such that d = 0), or
social partners are genetically unrelated (such that r = 0), or genotype unconditionally
determines phenotype (such that P = 1 or P = 0). In any other situation, they are not
equal, because βP ′P ̸= r. In short:
The SC is satisfied by the IF regression model ⇐⇒
d = 0 or r = 0 or P = 1 or P = 0 (A16)
B. The multi-level selection case
We turn now to the multi-level selection (MLS) approach. As a preliminary, we need
to give a formal characterization of the multi-level separation of selection gradients and
heritabilities that we described informally at the end of Section 2 in the main text. A
multi-level regression analysis first splits the overall evolutionary change into a between-
group component and a within-group component, and then seeks to separate the eﬀects
of selection and heritability on each component.
There are two main ways to split the overall change into between- and within-group
components: one is to partition the covariance term of the simple Price equation through
recursive expansion in the manner of Price (1972); the other (known as ‘contextual
analysis’) is to partition the covariance term through multivariate regression (Heisler and
Damuth 1987). We focus on the first method here, in part because Queller (1992b) does,
and in part because the alternative ‘contextual analysis’ method is extremely similar to
the inclusive fitness method discussed above (see Okasha 2006 for a comparison of the
‘Price approach’ with ‘contextual analysis’; the parallels between the latter and inclusive
fitness are noted by Goodnight 2013).
We therefore start with the following multi-level version of the Price equation, orig-
inally derived by Price (1972):
W∆G = Cov(Wi, Gi) + E
[
Covi(Wij , Gij)
]
(B1)
in whichWi and Gi represent (respectively) the average fitness and breeding value of the
ith group, and Wij and Gij represent (respectively) the individual fitness and breeding
value of the jth member of the ith group. Accordingly, Cov(Wi, Gi) represents the
between-group covariance, while Covi(Wij , Gij) represents the within-group covariance
in the ith group. We then introduce two simple regression models to express a group’s
fitness as a function of its average phenotypic value (Pi), and an individual’s diﬀerential
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fitness relative to its local group mean as a function of its own phenotypic value (Pij):
Wi = α1 + βWiPiPi + ϵWi (B2)
Wij = α2 + β
i
WijPijPij + ϵWij (B3)
On the assumptions firstly that Cov(Gi, ϵWi) = 0 and secondly that, for all i,
Covi(Gij , ϵWij ) = 0 (i.e. that the separation condition is satisfied for both the between-
group and within-group regressions), we can use these two simple regressions to derive
the following decomposition of evolutionary change:
W∆G = βWiPiCov(Gi, Pi) + E
[
βiWijPijCov
i(Gij , Pij)
]
(B4)
To say that the separation condition (SC) is satisfied by this approach in context of
the van Veelen et al. synergy game is to say that the residuals in the two multi-level
regressions (equations (B2) and (B3) above) do not co-vary with breeding value in this
game, and consequently that the quantitative-genetic separation envisioned in equation
(B4) is a correct statement about the evolutionary change in this game. Hence:
The SC is satisfied by the MLS regression model ⇐⇒
Cov(W,G) = βWiPiCov(Gi, Pi) + E
[
βiWijPijCov
i(Gij , Pij)
]
(B5)
By focussing only on the between-group component of the overall covariance, and by
noting that (by definition) βWiPi = Cov(Wi, Pi)/Var(Pi), we can obtain the following
necessary condition for the SC to be satisfied:
The SC is satisfied by the MLS regression model =⇒
Cov(Wi, Gi) =
Cov(Gi, Pi)Cov(Wi, Pi)
Var(Pi)
(B6)
This is only a necessary condition for the SC to be satisfied by our multi-level regression
model; it is not a suﬃcient condition, since the within-group component of the co-
variance must also be separable into a (within-group) heritability and a (within-group)
selection gradient. But a necessary condition is enough to draw relevant conclusions as
to what the satisfaction of the SC requires.
Using van Veelen and colleagues’ own computations of the relevant covariances for
their synergy game, we can show that our MLS regression model will tend to fail the
separation condition when payoﬀs deviate from additivity. Here are their results:
Cov(Wi, Pi) = Pp
[(
b− c
2
)
(1 + rP) +P(r + (1− r)p)d
]
−(Pp)2
[(
b− c
2
)
(1 + r) +P(r + (1− r)p)d
]
(B7)
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Cov(Gi, Pi) =
1
2
Pp(1− p)(1 + r) (B8)
Cov(Wi, Gi) = Pp(1− p)
[
(b− c)
2
(1 + r) +P(r + (1− r)p)d
]
(B9)
These are (respectively) results (B.18), (B.15), and (B.10) in their (2012) paper. To as-
sess whether or not the condition expressed in equation (B5) is satisfied in this model, we
need one more quantity—the variance in group phenotype, Var(Pi)—which we compute
to be the following:
Var(Pi) =
1
2
[
Pp(1 + rP)− (Pp)2(1 + r)] (B10)
The above results jointly imply the following:
Cov(Wi, Gi) =
Cov(Gi, Pi)Cov(Wi, Pi)
Var(Pi)
⇐⇒ (B11)
Pp(1− p) [P(r + (1− r)p)d] = [Pp(1− p)]
2 (1 + r)
Pp(1 + rP)− (Pp)2(1 + r) · [P(r + (1− r)p)d]
from which we conclude that the SC can be satisfied by the MLS approach only in
the special cases of d = 0, r = 0, P = 1, or (applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule) in the limit as
P→ 0. In other words, in the special cases of perfectly additive payoﬀs or unconditional
determination of phenotype by genotype, a two-predictor multi-level selection regression
model meets our necessary condition for a clean quantitative-genetic separation. But
in the more general case of d ̸= 0, r ̸= 0 and 0 < P < 1, the two sides of the above
equation are not equal, and the SC cannot be satisfied. In short:
The SC is satisfied by the MLS regression model =⇒
d = 0 or r = 0 or P = 1 or P = 0 (B12)
This result confirms Queller’s original claim that both two-predictor regression models
fail to satisfy the separation condition when relatives interact socially and payoﬀs deviate
from additivity, except in the special cases of zero relatedness or unconditional determi-
nation of phenotype by genotype. In either case, the way to overcome the problem is to
add more predictors to the regression model in order to take deviations from additivity
explicitly into account (Queller 1992b; Smith et al. 2010; Cornforth et al. 2012).
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